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I.

INTRODUCTION

Suicidality is defined as ongoing thoughts, ideations, desires, and behaviors to kill oneself. In
the United States, suicidality is considered to be an outcome of a diagnosed or undiagnosed
mental illness.1 Indeed, the contemporary bioethical discussion that could approach a more
philosophical and theoretical understanding of mental illness and its relation to suicidality has
difficult run-ins with our common societal perception of mental illness and its relation to
suicidality. This can be explained in one of two ways. Perhaps, bioethicists have shied away
from making arguments regarding mental health and illness.2 Or, more likely, bioethicists feel as
though they are trapped within a landscape crowded with, what seem to be, medically
indisputable truths on the rationality and decision-making capacity of mentally ill patients,
ultimately creating barriers for them to craft controversial and cutting-edge claims that challenge
the current understanding of suicidality.3
This article intends to contribute to the ongoing bioethical discussion regarding mental illness
and suicidality. More precisely, I will first define what I mean by suicidality and its relation to
mental illness before then qualifying the population to which I hope to extend this argument.
Next, I outline Miranda Fricker’s classic framework for epistemic injustice within Kidd and
Carel’s paper “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare.”4 Following that, I offer an account of how the
stigma toward suicidality is inextricably tied to the medicalization of the act of suicidality itself. I
argue that suicidal people are especially vulnerable targets of epistemic injustice in the United
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States healthcare system5 and I offer examples of both testimonial injustice and hermeneutical
injustice in the modern day. These examples are taken from scholarly sources as well as the
ethnographic data and results I have personally collected in my two previous research projects
titled: “Suicidality from the Perspective of the Mental Healthcare Professional” and “An
Ethnographic Inquiry into the Attitudes and Perceptions of Suicidality from Survivors of
Suicide.”
The central goal of my project is to draw attention to the ongoing and pervasive epistemic
injustice experienced by suicidal people. The phrase “suicidal people” in this paper will be
defined as people who have lived experience of suicidal behaviors, ideations, and tendencies
who have adopted those lived experiences into their internal identity, meaning that they would
not know who they are without the passive or active desire to kill themselves. Although separate
from the central argument, I argue that this specific population of suicidal people can fulfill the
rationality requirements set for physician-assisted suicide and therefore ought to be allowed to
participate in ‘Death with Dignity' programs.
II.

SUICIDALITY

The World Health Organization,6 the American Psychological Association,7 and the
American Psychiatric Association8 all claim that suicide is preventable, and therefore, ought not
to occur. When a suicide does transpire, it is considered to be an unfortunate failure of the
deceased’s family, friends, and mental healthcare system. Moreover, suicide, in our social
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perception, is also inextricably tied to our social understanding of mental illness.9 In the past year
alone, the suicides of Kate Spade and Anthony Bourdain were immediately met with Twitter and
Facebook statuses lamenting the tragedy of unchecked and untreated mental illness. Our
immediate social response to suicide is to equate it to mental illness, rendering any desire to kill
oneself an irrational act that is counterintuitive to our evolutionary and social purpose; suicidality
rips us away from our loved ones and our biological life. Ultimately, when we deem the act or
attempt of suicide as merely a mistake made to end a "false sense of suffering," we
simultaneously render suicide to be a medical issue to be resolved, with little to no concern for
the existential aspects found within the plight of a suicidal person.
Of course, suicidality and mental illness frequently do present in tandem with one another.
Therefore, I will not (nor can I attempt to) argue that suicidality is always a stand-alone behavior.
However, it is an underlying assumption of this paper that, albeit infrequently, mental illness is
not a necessary condition for suicidality. Moreover, the existential aspects of suicidality are
evident, especially to those of us who have struggled with suicidal thoughts, behaviors, ideations,
and tendencies. It is integral to my argument that I address the fact that people who experience
and are affected by suicidality frequently grow to identify internally with the experience and
thought process of the desire to kill oneself. In other words, people who are suicidal, within the
population parameters I will outline next, frequently adopt this lived experience into their
identity, similar to others who adopt experiences and behaviors into their understanding of
themselves. Take, for example, Mia, a 25-year-old soccer player who has played the sport since
she was four. Although she can visit coffee shops and not be clocked for her identity as a soccer
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player, Mia still may understand that without soccer, she is not entirely herself; the chronically
suicidal person strikes me as no different.
However, there are many instances, if not the vast majority, in which the suicidal person is
irrational and suffering from the cognitive impairment of a crisis episode. An episode of this type
is known to distort the reality of the sufferer, making their outlook on life at that moment
overwhelmingly bleak. Mental healthcare professionals and crisis intervention volunteers receive
training to talk people down from these metaphorical "crisis cliffs." The National Suicide
Prevention Line for the United States of America claims that these "crisis cliffs" are sudden,
short-lived, and preventable. During a personal crisis, people often experience hikes in anxiety
and feelings of hopelessness. I argue that people who are in a crisis episode or are teetering on
the edge of a "crisis cliff" are both epistemically unreliable10 and do not identify internally with
suicidality and therefore do not fit into my proposed population parameters.
Moreover, suicidality is frequently experienced in the years of adolescence. Once again,
it is well known, or at least commonly believed, that in young people the developing brain is
especially susceptible to poorly estimating the consequences of their decisions.11 There are a few
explanations for this: the temporal lobe, the decision-making center of the brain, is not fully
developed.12 Or, the emotional intelligence of a young person has not yet been exercised enough
to control overreaction in instances that do not require the magnitude of a crisis episode.13 With
both of those beliefs held as standard in the United States, I do not desire to extend my argument
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to people under age 25 because, they too, fall into the population that is epistemically unreliable,
despite their adoption of suicidality into their lived experience.
Finally, this thesis excludes some people who are considering physician-assisted suicide
for a terminal physical illness. Although these people do want to kill themselves, in most cases, I
interpret this experience as a different manner of desiring death, as it is not standardly
incorporated into their identities.
III.

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

In her book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and ethics of knowing, Miranda Fricker argues that
the dominant discourse or epistemic authority often excludes and or refuses to recognize the
testimony of marginalized people to the extent that the greater hermeneutical resource is left with
gaps or lacunas of knowledge of the marginalized and oppressed.14 Fricker calls this
phenomenon “epistemic injustice.” Kidd and Carel extend this framework to ill people within
developed nations’ healthcare systems.
Both accounts argue that “[these] social and epistemic practices are integral to our rationality,
identity, agency, and dignity, it is evident that injustice which harms our testimonial and
hermeneutical capacities will be a source of great harm.”15 That is, when epistemic injustice goes
unchecked, the harm to the epistemic minority is one that alienates their confidence and capacity
as a knower of their own experience.
a. POWER, PREJUDICE, AND STEREOTYPES
A necessary condition for Fricker’s epistemic injustice is her conception of social
power.16 More specifically, it is a form of passive, agential, identity power that a social agent
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(the epistemic authority) passively and systemically enacts upon a less powerful agent, i.e., a
“social other.”17 This power dynamic then directly contributes to and exacerbates the preexisting
prejudicial or stereotypical understanding of a person’s epistemic credibility or reliability. 18
These prejudices often operate “without any focused awareness” and are “culpably resistant to
evidence.”19 They are therefore irrational but persist and disseminate further solely because of
the agent’s powerful identity.20 These stereotypes within Fricker’s initial framework connote
psychological fragility, predisposition to lie or exaggerate, social vulnerability, etc.
Kidd and Carel argue that the stereotypes and prejudices ill people face are unique to the
medical setting. For example, doctors (the powerful social agent) typically assume that their
patients (the social other) are suffering from: “incapacitation, disability, diminished agency,
social vulnerability, psychological fragility, and bodily failure” of some sort.21 These medical
prejudices connote different derogatory perceptions of the ill than typical epistemic injustice.
Kidd and Carel believe that the root of these prejudices is a diminished sense of relevance of the
ill person; the ill lack the ability “to determine which ideas are worth taking seriously, which
objections are meritorious, and so on.”22 Ordinarily, these stereotypes are implemented the
moment a patient speaks to their pain, discomfort, and illness. Kidd and Carel argue that the
concerns about the patient-physician relationship, the efficacy of medical care, and public trust in
medicine can be usefully reframed in terms of fundamental epistemological problems.23
Consequently, epistemic injustice in healthcare is the result of the doctor’s preference for the
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biomedical approach to illness that “focuses on the biological rather than the existential.”24 These
“task-based"25 biomedical approaches hinder the opportunity for sustained, meaningful contact
between healthcare professionals and their patients, that would hopefully mitigate the "erosion of
epistemic confidence and capacities of the ill person."26
Therefore, in both frameworks, if the prejudice or stereotype is in place during the time
of the initial epistemic exchange, the dominant and powerful non-marginalized person will then
assume, because of the stereotype or prejudice, that the person with whom they are speaking is
not their epistemic peer and will, therefore, discredit their testimony as epistemically unreliable.
b. TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE
Epistemic injustice is principally caused by the prejudicial assumptions mentioned above.
The first kind of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice. Broadly speaking, prejudicial
dysfunction in testimonial practice can be of two kinds. Either the prejudice results in the speaker
receiving more credibility than they otherwise would have — a credibility excess — or it results
in the speaker receiving less credibility than they otherwise would have — a credibility deficit.27
These credibility assessments happen quickly and are often attributed to our initial
understanding of the agent. If there is a credibility excess given to the epistemic minority,
testimonial injustice is unlikely to occur. If there is a credibility deficit, testimonial injustice is
likely. Testimonial injustice then is when an agent's word is not given the credit it deserves, as
we now know, because of a preexisting prejudice, e.g., “women are irrational and hence are
uncredible.” Therefore, despite a testimony that was both accurate and truth-seeking, it may not
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be considered the "truth" because the epistemic authority discounted the testimony due to a
commonly held stereotype.
Similarly, Kidd and Carel claim that doctors and physicians are the dominant epistemic
authority when it comes to illness and disease, and through their social standing, they allow
prejudice to degrade ill patients’ “epistemic peer” status to that of mere “epistemic objects”
because of their own doubts to their patients’ credibility as knowers of the medical aspects of
their afflictions. The following quote from Kidd and Carel further elucidates this phenomenon:

...ill persons are often subjected to one or more of a range of negative stereotypes, which,
though diverse, often include attribution which tends to undermine their epistemic
competence and capacities…Such negative stereotypes will therefore prejudicially
deprive ill persons of the prerequisites of reliable epistemic conduct… the consequence
of this negative stereotyping is that patients' testimonies are unjustly accorded lower
degrees of epistemic credibility that they otherwise would.28

Kidd and Carel then utilize Gaile Pohlhaus’s more recent configuration of the harm of
testimonial injustice: truncated subjectivity. That is, the ill person, because of preexisting
prejudices, is regulated between “epistemic other” and “epistemic object.”29 Patient testimonies
are only sources of factual information, and anything beyond the factual is reduced to menial
emotional concerns, thus, objectifying patients’ bodies by considering only the parts of their
testimonies that are deemed biomedically valuable.

28
29
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c. HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE
Fricker then moves to explain the second type of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical
injustice. The word “hermeneutical” stems from “hermeneutics," which is defined as the theory
and methodology of interpretation. Therefore, hermeneutical injustice is signified by a lack of
knowledge or information that would be utilized to evaluate, understand, and interpret
testimonies. This kind of epistemic injustice is due to preexisting lacunas within the greater
hermeneutical resource that ultimately makes it difficult for the dominant epistemic group to
realize that an epistemic injustice is occurring, simultaneously harming the target's capacity as a
knower. This is known as hermeneutical marginalization.30 The consequence is the inability for
the epistemically marginalized to understand their own lived experience beyond what the
epistemic authority tells them, harming their confidence and capacity as knowers.31 These
marginalized people are rendered unable to make sense of their experiences because they lack
the adequate hermeneutical resource to evaluate their experiences properly.
Moreover, the epistemic authority (i.e., the "marginalizers") cannot recognize or respond
to the concerns and experiences of the ill because they too lack the hermeneutical resource to
evaluate the existential experience of the social other accurately.
In accordance with Fricker, Kidd and Carel believe that ill persons are especially
vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice. Within the case of illness, hermeneutical injustice arises
because the resources required for understanding the ill persons' plight are not accepted as a
valuable part of the dominant hermeneutical resource.32 This healthcare specific hermeneutical
injustice takes hold of physicians through two types of strategies. These are known as strategies
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of exclusion, in which the hermeneutically marginalized group is excluded from practices and
places where social meaning is made and legitimized33 and strategies of expression, in which the
social group is excluded because, as Fricker argues, its “characteristic expressive style [is not]
recognized as rational and contextually appropriate.”34 Ill persons, according to Kidd and Carel,
are excepted and discounted from participating in creating medical and social meaning. They are
non-dominant and not respected as accurately making sense of their medical experiences and
illnesses.
The harm is then a “double injury.”35 The hermeneutical marginalization of ill people
makes their epistemic experience both inarticulable and ineffable; meaning that the ill person’s
marginalization is exacerbated because they cannot accurately or adequately speak to their
experience within the modern biomedical understanding of the illness.36 Kidd and Carel argue
that this is why many ill people turn to artistic forms of communication and expression as well as
other groups who have had similar experiences, e.g., chronic pain groups. Both the inarticulacy
and ineffability caused by the hermeneutical marginalization creates an epistemic environment
that lends itself to the eventual epistemic isolation of the ill person. That is, the ill person fully
understands what is going on with their body, and yet, they are unable to receive uptake from
those around them, specifically those who are supposed to help heal and guide them through the
process, their doctors and physicians.37
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IV.

THE MEDICALIZATION AND PREJUDICES OF SUICIDALITY

I maintain that the medicalization of suicidality directly contributes to a decreased sense of
relevance of the suicidal person that directly lends itself to the stigmatization and prejudice of
suicidal person. Following Fricker and Kidd and Carel, I argue that this prejudice ultimately
leads to both the testimonial and hermeneutical injustice of the suicidal person. Medicalization is
a process by which human conditions and problems become defined and treated as medical
conditions.38 The medical model of mental health is known and understood as the initial
medicalization of individuals whose mood and behavior deviates from the norm. In the modern
day, the medical model has become the standard. Someone who displays symptoms of
depression (e.g., extreme fatigue, loss of interest, feelings of hopelessness, etc.) has very little
options beyond treatment from a medical professional. The treatment of mental illness is
considered to have two parts: the first being psychotherapy (talk therapy with a licensed
psychologist or therapist), and the second being psychopharmacology (pharmaceutical
intervention, e.g., an SSRI or mood stabilizer).
Suicidality is now formally medicalized. The DSM-V in 2014 adopted “Suicidal Behavior
Disorder” as a diagnosis for anyone who exhibits or presents with suicidality.39 The diagnosis
can be considered comorbid, but it can act as a stand-alone diagnosis. Therefore, any instance of
suicidality beyond our social perception becomes an act of mental illness/behavior disorder.
The consequences of having a documented suicide attempt, involuntary commitment, or
severe chronic suicidality are actually quite depressing.40 Ethnographic data quotes individuals
who have previously been suicidal as being turned away from the United States Army, turned
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Peter Conrad. "Medicalization and Social Control." Annual Review of Sociology. (1992): 212.
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away from the United States Peace Corps, prohibited from owning a gun, and being banned from
signing one’s own Do Not Resuscitate order.41 Although these consequences are documented in
other instances in which the mental fitness of a person is called into question (i.e., people with
dementia, Alzheimer's, and schizophrenia), one would think that suicidality is often unlike these
other conditions as often they occur during the previously discussed crisis episodes i.e., they
occur once, during an emotionally overwhelming time and then never again.
The injustice suicidal people face grows clearer, regardless of whether or not it is adopted
into their identity. However, to remain within the scope of the paper, I only mention these
consequences to note that the assumptions stemming from the medicalization of mental illness
and suicidality are harmful. Moreover, I argue that the liability concerns of organizations like the
United States Army and Peace Corps, along with the doubt physicians feel when treating a
suicidal patient are the direct result of the epistemic injustice incurred to suicidal people in the
United States mental healthcare system.
The recent creation of "suicidal behavior disorder" may foster an understanding that
suicidality is comparable to severe mental illnesses like dementia and schizophrenia. I would be
remiss to neglect the ramifications of medicalization on a sociological and philosophical scale.
Michel Foucault grew increasingly concerned about the medicalization of society in his Birth of
the Clinic. Essentially, Foucault argued that the act of medicalization would develop into a
powerful and insidious form of social control.42 Peter Conrad sustained this critique in his
“Medicalization as Social Control,” outlining the negative consequences of the medicalization of
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deviant social behaviors.43 Conrad even mentions suicidality and argues that medicine has
dislodged religion as the dominant moral ideology and that:

[m]any conditions have become transformed from sin to crime to sickness… Although
physicians had little to do with it, social responses to suicide were secularized in the
eighteenth century due to a general loss in confidence in diabolical powers; suicide was more
or less medicalized by default.44

The remaining parts of this paper aim to critique the medicalization of suicidality but are also
dependent on the medical model of mental illness.45 Therefore, I remain neutral, at least for the
purpose of this paper, on whether or not the medicalization of mental illness itself is
problematic.46 I choose to place my argument within the context of the biomedical model of
mental illness, only because that is where the current conversation exists. Consequently, if there
are ways within the system that we can push back against injustice, we ought to do so in the
present. I leave more revolutionary, radical, and disruptive arguments for my future work — as
well as others concerned with science, psychiatry, and social justice.
V.

TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE AND SUICIDALITY

The question is whether suicidal people are especially vulnerable to testimonial injustice,
more so than general ill persons. My answer is that they are. Suicidal people and suicidality writ
large are immediately stereotyped and stigmatized the moment that the word suicide is uttered,
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extending directly from the stigma toward mental illness. This stigma is further complicated by
the societal perception that the act of suicide is a failure by both the victim and their family to
manage some emotional issue, and ultimately, society affixes blame for the loss on the
survivors.47 Moreover, in the initial psychological evaluation or intake exam, the psychiatrist is
required by law to evaluate the patient's suicidality, and if severe enough, the doctor is able to
commit the patient involuntarily.48
On the first pass, it seems as though sustained, meaningful contact (a facet of healthcare Kidd
and Carel believe would mitigate testimonial injustice between healthcare professionals and their
patients is built directly into the biomedical model of mental health. Indeed, the United States
mental healthcare system insists on doctor-patient relationships as an essential aspect of
treatment. Furthermore, the American Psychological Association recommends that the treatment
for any mental illness ought to consist of two parts: a pharmaceutical component, such as an
SSRI, like Wellbutrin or other mood stabilizers; along with a talk therapy component, such as
CBT (Cognitive Behavioral Therapy) or DBT (Dialectical Behavioral Therapy). 49 However, it is
clear that testimonial injustice frequently occurs in these therapy sessions when we carefully
interrogate what the basis is for talk therapy and what the desired end result is.
Kidd and Carel argue that mental illness can exacerbate epistemic injustice because it
reinforces the negative stereotypes doctors have toward their patients when they state:
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William Feigelman, Bernard S. Gorman, and John R. Jordan. "Stigmatization and suicide bereavement." Death
Studies 33, no. 7 (2009): 591-608
48
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[B]eing cognitively impaired or emotionally compromised, owing either to their somatic
condition or their psychological reactions to it (mutatis mutandis for psychiatric illness);
or as existentially unstable, gripped by anxieties about mortality and morbidity such that
they cannot think straight; or that they will be psychologically dominated by their illness
in a way that warps their capacity to accurately describe and report their experiences… 50

I argue that, in spite of talk therapy, the testimonies of the mentally ill are doubted by
their doctors. I can easily imagine a case in which a chronically suicidal person enters into a
medical clinic and claims that they desire to kill themselves, but they are immediately met with
the classic, "You don't actually want to kill yourself. That’s just the depression talking.”
Moreover, unlike bodily illnesses, mental illnesses and suicidality have these stereotypes
built into their definition, leaving almost no wiggle room for the patient to advocate for their own
lived experience or for their desire to die. The suicidal person’s testimony is ignored because this
stereotype is an inherent part of the illness.51 This renders suicidal patients, because of societal
and medical prejudice, irrational agents. Therefore, they are hardly given epistemic credence,
whereas, at least in some states, a terminally ill person would have the opportunity to participate
in physician-assisted suicide,52 of course, assuming that their testimony is given the proper
uptake and trust.
The incongruent case of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) for terminally or chronically ill
patients is perhaps the most obvious consequence of epistemic injustice that suicidal people incur

Kidd and Carel, “Epistemic Injustice and illness,” 177.
To be “mentally ill” is to have a compromised mental or emotional state in some regard. Therefore, the
stereotypes listed above that Kidd and Carel offer toward physically ill patients, e.g., being emotionally
compromised or existentially unstable…that they cannot think straight are quintessential aspects of mental illness.
52
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) also known as physician-assisted death is legal in a handful of states:
Washington, the District of Columbia, Oregon, California, Colorado, Hawaii, and Vermont.
50

51
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in the United States, especially when we consider the country’s recent push to eradicate the
stigma toward mental illness. Perhaps the most successful tactic to destigmatize mental illness is
by equating it directly to physical illness.53 Now, I do not intend to unpack this claim in this
paper. However, if this equalization is the next step in the current crusade to destigmatize mental
illness, then it only follows that – in the states where physician-assisted suicide is legal for
patients with physical illnesses – the same opportunity ought to be afforded to mentally ill
individuals who meet existing requirements to also die with dignity.
"Death with Dignity laws allow qualified adults to voluntarily request and receive a
prescription medication to hasten their death."54 The requirements to qualify are that patients
must be 18 years or older, must be mentally competent ( i.e., capable of making and
communicating their own healthcare decisions), must be able to self-administer and ingest
prescribed medication, and must be diagnosed with a terminal illness that will, within reasonable
medical judgment, lead to death within six months.55 Before I discuss further how epistemic
injustice plays a significant role in the above requirements, I first want to make room for a
popular understanding of how the second listed requirement functions in clinical settings.
Margaret Battin, professor of philosophy and bioethics at the University of Utah, has become
a prominent player in discussions concerning the ethics of suicide.56 Battin created the following
five criteria that effectively outline the capacity for the rationality of the patient to meet the
requirement.

53

See the American Psychological Association Website or the American Psychiatric Website for direct quotes
equating mental illness to physical illness.
54
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These are:
1. The ability to reason, which asks, “Can the person see the consequences of his or her
actions and weigh the prospect of dying against existing with a terminal disease?”
2. A realistic worldview. “Does the person have a realistic assessment of the current
situation?”
3. Adequacy of information. “Does the person have an accurate diagnosis and prognosis?”
4. Avoidance of harm. “Has the pain or suffering from the disease been considered to be a
greater harm than suicide?”
5. Accordance with fundamental mental interests, which questions the foreseeable loss of
independence, mobility, consciousness, etc.
The discrepancy between the opportunity for PAS for terminally ill people in comparison
with the opportunity for mentally ill people (whose mental illness significantly diminishes their
quality of life) is an outstanding example of the kinds of testimonial injustice that mentally ill
people face that physically ill — or "the ill," as Kidd and Carel put it — do not.
I imagine that those who oppose this view may, primarily, take issue with this claim for
the sole reason that mentally ill people are not explicitly facing death within six months.
However, this counter-argument misconstrues the purpose of physician-assisted suicide. I argue
that there are two benefits of introducing physician-assisted suicide laws. The first benefit can be
understood within the context of the original PAS law in Oregon state. The law, titled "Death
with Dignity Act (DWDA)" was sold to Oregonians as being a peaceful and gracious alternative
to suffering and ultimately dying due to a terminal illness. It was also promoted as a means for
patients who were suffering to end their lives on their own terms, rather than waiting for their
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illness to kill them. Patients are given the legal right to end their lives in a manner that is less
chaotic.57 The patients are given control, and, of course, dignity.
This is an example of testimonial injustice when we re-consider Battin's five criteria with
a special concern for people who live with a chronic mental illness or with a mental illness that,
when medicated, severely diminishes the quality of life of the patient. Consider Amanda, a
thirty-three-year-old who has lived with depression since she was a teenager.

I’ve tried everything.” She said. “Prozac, Wellbutrin, even Zoloft. You name it, I’ve tried
it. Some of them aren’t so bad. But, a lot of them, like Kolnopin, just wipes you out. You
don’t feel anything at all.

Amanda’s lived experience is not uncommon. I have heard countless narratives of people
living with a mental illness who hate taking their medication because although it makes it so they
don't feel the desire to kill themselves, it also takes away any opportunity for feeling at all. With
Amanda’s narrative in mind, let us reconsider whether a mentally ill person can meet all of
Battin's criteria for a rational suicide.
This paper is concerned with epistemic injustice; therefore, I focus only on the first three
criteria, as those are pertinent to trust the lived experience of the knower.
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Perhaps one of the most significant selling points for states who have passed Death with Dignity laws are the
anecdotes of loved ones who are thankful that they were able to properly say goodbye to their loved one as they
passed. Rather than being surprised and facing excruciating heartbreak of a somewhat unexpected death or
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unable to plan.

19 Lilly
1. The ability to reason: Within the designated population parameters, it seems highly
probable that people who have been suicidal for years and years and have therefore
stayed alive for years without wanting to, do not seem to be irrational. If anything, living
in anguish with no desire to stay alive and no foreseeable fix seems more irrational than
weighing one’s death against living unhappily.

2. A realistic worldview: It is not immediately clear how the chronically-depressed or
chronically suicidal person differs from the chronically/terminally ill person in this
criterion. Similarly, to the physically ill person, the chronically suicidal person has a
realistic worldview as it is affected by their illness in the same way that someone with
Stage 4 cancer might – a life of pain and suffering.

3. Adequacy of information: This is where it becomes clear that the medical model of
mental illness is necessary. If the person with treatment-resistant depression has an
accurate diagnosis, why must we keep them alive? This is a vastly different mentality
than we hold with chronically ill patients. Is it due to the slim possibility that they might
someday receive a better diagnosis? Or, is it in hopes that a new, effective medication
will be released? Both of these sound like a needless extension of suffering and anguish,
all for the sake of keeping the biological body alive.
VI.

HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE AND SUICIDALITY
Recall that hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is not a proper, adequate, or

accurate evaluative mechanism within the greater hermeneutical resource for attending
physicians or patients to interpret their epistemic experience correctly, making their experience
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both inarticulable and ineffable. Indeed, the very same circumstances Kidd and Carel understand
to cause and exacerbate hermeneutical injustice are experienced by the suicidal person. This is
because the epistemic authority cannot recognize or respond to the concerns and experiences of
the suicidal because they too are uncertain of the reality of the experience.
Thus, the question is whether or not suicidal people are especially vulnerable to
hermeneutical injustice. My answer is they are. There is no interpretive tool for the epistemic
authority nor the suicidal person themselves to accurately understand the existential experience
of suicidality beyond the medical understanding that views suicidality to be confused and the
outcome of a diagnosed or undiagnosed mental illness. The previous experience then lends itself
to the exclusion of the suicidal person from the medical and academic circles that contextualize
an existential meaning of "suicidality" beyond medicalization. And, the suicidal person is also
unable to properly express the severity of their plight. This is evident when we revisit the
biomedical understanding of suicidality. The modern medical model views suicide always to be
preventable and therefore when someone desires to kill themselves, they are irrational. Take for
example, Betty, a psychiatrist practicing in the Pacific Northwest of the United States America,
and her response to the probing question.

Do you think people who are suicidal actually want to kill themselves? Or, do you think
it’s something different?

Betty’s replied: "That's not something that anybody would actually want. There is a
difference between wanting to kill yourself when you are terminally ill and wanting to kill
yourself when you are mentally ill.” Moreover, Betty also elucidated that suicidality is also
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contextually unfitting: "People who desire to kill themselves are just too depressed to actually
see the value in their lives – it’s my job as a psychiatrist to ensure that I give them the best go at
a life they want to live.” However, noble Betty’s responses may be, her responses are founded in
medicalized prejudice/stereotype and are therefore are the beginning of epistemic injustice.
The best-documented example of hermeneutical injustice comes from Mary P. Henman's
account of "Suicidal Patients with a Do-Not-Resuscitate Order." The dilemma proceeds as
follows:

An elderly woman with a known terminal illness presented in the emergency department
after a suspected suicide attempt. She had a DNR order during her previous
hospitalization. The emergency physician felt obligated to intubate the woman despite his
recognition that she was terminally ill.58

I argue that the only reason why this is an ethical dilemma is because of the pre-existing
assumption or stereotype that all suicide attempts are irrational. Henman agrees. Not all patients
who attempt suicide are necessarily incapable of making a rational decision about their
healthcare. In some cases, it may be appropriate to withhold resuscitation attempts in suicidal
patients who have a preexisting DNR order.59
It does not escape me, however, that there is a lot of grey area here. Perhaps the elderly
woman was in crisis, and the on-call physician was only "erring on the side of life," a common
phrase and practice in bioethics. Yet, the case still acts as a thought-provoking dilemma. If the
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doctor was told that the elderly woman attempted suicide fully lucid and rational, would he still
feel obligated to intubate her, disregarding her DNR? My intuition says yes. The current medical
understanding of suicidality argues it is that always irrational and therefore must always be
prevented; this initial moral understanding is caused by the epistemic injustice surrounding
suicidality.
I take no specific stance on how the doctor should have acted in this scenario – similarly to
my reluctance to make precipitous claims about the medicalization of all of mental illness, I am
reluctant to say that anyone who has a prehospital DNR should not have their suicide intervened
in, as it is incredibly difficult to determine the circumstances before their arrival in the
emergency room. I do maintain that the thought pattern of most doctors, psychiatrists,
psychologists, and society writ large60 is that suicide is always irrational, and the cause of this
one-track thinking is hermeneutical injustice of suicidal people. This can be explained with both
the models provided for hermeneutical injustice. It either constitutes hermeneutical injustice
because both the doctors and the patients do not have the knowledge available within the greater
hermeneutical resource to understand that suicidality does not always constitute irrationality. Or,
this phenomenon can also be understood within the causation understanding of hermeneutical
injustice; meaning that doctors incorrectly apply the current knowledge within the hermeneutical
resource, most likely the correct knowledge as it applies to young people and those in crisis, to
those people who have adopted suicidality into their identity and live day to day with the rational
desire to put an end to their numbness, pain, and strife.

60

Recall the social responses to celebrity suicides.
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I also I take no specific stance on which model of hermeneutical injustice is at play in the
Henman case, nor is it immediately clear to me which model is the most fitting. I leave these
distinctions and arguments for future bioethicists to clarify and argue.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This paper provided an outline of both Miranda Fricker’s framework of epistemic injustice
followed by an outline of Kidd and Carel’s extension of Fricker’s framework to healthcare
systems. I argued that the current medicalization of suicidality leads to irrational prejudices and
stereotypes of suicidal people both of which foster the perfect conditions for epistemic injustice
toward suicidal people.
I also argued that mental illness and suicidality are often inextricable within the social
understanding of suicidality but can sometimes come apart. I claimed that suicidal people are
especially vulnerable to testimonial injustice because the stereotypes of irrationality and
emotional vulnerability are built into the diagnosis of mental illness (which follows immediately
after a suicide attempt). I then offered the incongruent case of physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill people but not chronically depressed people. I continued to show that suicidal
people are also especially susceptible to hermeneutical injustice, the example there being
Henman's case of "Suicidal Patients with a DNR."
The ethical implications of this paper call for a reformation of societal and medical attitudes
and perceptions toward suicidal people. The analysis also offers several potential avenues to
combat both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by suicidal people. However,
perhaps the most important implication of this paper – the implication I am most hopeful about –
is a call for more bioethicists to focus on the plight of suicidal people in the United States mental
healthcare system.
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